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Jeffrey Gil and Minglei Wang

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Taiwan is promoting its linguistic and cultural diversity (Image source: Taiwan Today)

Taiwan faces a dire international environment manifested in a lack of formal diplomatic recognition and a serious threat to its existence from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Under these circumstances, Taiwan must communicate narratives and project images about itself to the international community in order to “increase Taiwan’s visibility and gather moral support”, especially from other democratic societies.

Taiwan has used language policy as one means of doing this, in particular by emphasising its democratic values and cultural heritage to highlight the differences between itself and the PRC. Examples can be seen in the Indigenous Language Development Act of 2017, which recognised indigenous languages as national languages and contained provisions to support and expand their development, teaching and use. The National Languages Development Act, passed in 2018, extended national language status to Holo (Southern Min variety of Chinese), Hakka (Kejia variety of Chinese) and Taiwanese Sign Language. It also aims to provide greater support for the use of these languages in education and society. According to Vickers and Lin (2022), an important purpose of such language policies is to portray Taiwan as “something more or other than simply a ‘Chinese’ society—that is, as a diverse, multicultural Asian democracy”.

In September 2021, Taiwan created the Taiwan Centre for Mandarin Learning (TCML) to teach and promote Mandarin abroad. We argue that the TCML initiative is also intended to enhance Taiwan’s international profile by distinguishing it from the PRC. Following a brief overview of the origins of the TCML, we focus on how Taiwan has attempted to contrast the TCML with the PRC’s Confucius Institutes (CIs), which have dominated the global promotion of Mandarin for the past two decades.

Establishment of the TCML

TCML promotional video

The TCML initiative is overseen by the Overseas Community Affairs Council (OCAC), a cabinet-level agency under the Executive Yuan, that is responsible for facilitating exchanges and interactions between Taiwan and communities of ethnic Taiwanese and Chinese in foreign countries. There are currently 66 TCMLs in the world, with 54 in the US and 12 in Europe.  Taiwan aims to increase the number of TCMLs to 100 by 2025, with a concurrent goal to establish what it describes as an “international status of Taiwanese Chinese language teaching”.

The origins of the TCML lie in the launch of the Taiwan-US Education Initiative in December 2020. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on international education cooperation was signed between the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office and American Institute in Taiwan (AIT),^[1] specifying that this partnership:

is expected to enhance and expand existing Mandarin and English language opportunities in the United States and on Taiwan. The MOU also encourages the exploration of opportunities for Mandarin and English language teachers and resources to be deployed to language programs at U.S. universities and Taiwan educational institutions, and facilitates greater exchange between U.S. and Taiwan institutions on best practices.

To the Taiwanese government, this signalled US support in “emphasizing and consolidating Taiwan’s important role in providing Mandarin learning opportunities for students from the US and other countries”, hence motivating the TCML project.

The establishment of the TCML was also facilitated by the US and Europe’s change of stance on the PRC’s dominating role in spreading Mandarin, as manifested in the shutdown of CIs. The CI project has caused concerns about its influence on teaching and research on China, the propagation of the Chinese government’s views, censorship on sensitive issues, and potential spying activities due to their links to the Chinese government and physical location on university campuses. Compounded by worsening relations between the PRC and the US and Europe, which generally hold an unfavourable image of China due to the country’s domestic and international behaviour, these concerns triggered the termination of CIs. The US, for example, has so far terminated 89 out of 122 CIs, while 19 CIs have been shut down across France, Sweden, Germany, Spain, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland.

TCML promotional poster

This subsequently leads to opportunities for Taiwan to fill the demand gap for Mandarin learning in the US and Europe, where TCMLs have thus far been established. It is in this sense that the inauguration of the TCML project is situated in a geopolitically competitive environment.

Framing the TCML: Mandarin with Taiwanese Characteristics

The TCML’s website highlights Taiwan’s intention to use the TCML to champion such values as “freedom, diversity, academic freedom, and freedom of speech”, which, in the eyes of the Taiwanese government, “form Taiwan’s key competitiveness” in the world. They have constructed a contrast between the TCML and CIs, although Taiwanese officials and directors of TCMLs have been reluctant to directly admit such a strategic orientation.

When commenting on the purpose of launching the TCML project, Tong Zhenyuan, former Chairman of OCAC, explained that:

we are not competing with Confucius Institutes, which are restricted by the American government and even driven out of the US. We, Taiwan, are collaborating with the US government to promote Mandarin teaching and learning on a different level, and we are confident in this situation to gain more support from America’s mainstream society, as we share the same values with the US.

Despite this, Tong emphasised at the inauguration of a TCML in Irvine, California that the aim of the centre was to provide a language learning environment that values “freedom and democracy while respecting cultural diversity” and this was “something that Confucius Institutes can simply not compete with”.

In a similar vein, Li Wenxiong, member of the OCAC, further elaborated that:

it is obvious that Confucius Institutes are basically used by the Chinese government to spread its communist ideology. I think Taiwan, most importantly, conducts teaching activities in a more open, democratic, and free manner, hence facilitating its educational approach into mainstream society as much as possible.

Kou Huifeng, director of the TCML in Silicon Valley, also held that the distinction between the TCML and CI was that “we have a free and open learning environment”. As Kou further noted, “we don’t compete [with CIs], what we do is to hope to let overseas non-Chinese have free choices [when learning Mandarin]”.

Another facet of diversity: Taiwan was the 1st country in Asia to legalize same-sex marriage (Image source: 360info)

This image of Taiwan as a provider of Mandarin language education is also displayed in the TCML’s promotional videos. One such video features several students expressing positive views of studying Mandarin in Taiwan. For instance, an American student said that “when you’re in a free country, which you’re able to express your own feelings and ideas, the Internet is not restricted, which makes studying easier”. Another student from the US shared that “in Taiwan, I’ve never run into any freedom of speech problems”. Likewise, an Israeli interviewee pointed out that there were “so-called sensitive issues” associated with her previous experience learning Mandarin which she had not experienced Taiwan. A Swiss/German learner even argued that Taiwan “is pretty much the only choice you have right now to study Chinese”, as “there is not much choice if you want to study Chinese in a free environment without having to be afraid for being arrested”.

This is not to say that the TCML is free of political constraints. The OCAC’s requirement that teachers employed by TCMLs “must not hold passports from Mainland China, Hong Kong or Macau” is similar to the PRC’s request that language instructors hired at CIs are not allowed to practice certain religious beliefs, such as Falun Gong. Furthermore, there appears to be political intervention from the Taiwanese government in some of the TCML’s media engagement. As reported by Nikkei Asia, a previously arranged interview with staff at a TCML in Heidelberg “was cancelled on short notice after a senior official in Taiwan intervened”.

Conclusion

The TCML has been conceived and portrayed as an alternative to the CIs. From the Taiwanese government’s perspective, emphasising values of democracy and freedom as the foundation for the TCML is a means through which Taiwan can compete with the PRC for the hearts and minds of Mandarin learners. The activities and reception of the TCML need to be further explored to determine whether this initiative will be successful in improving Taiwan’s international environment.

Acknowledgement

Our research project on the TCML is supported by the Flinders University College of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences (CHASS) Research Grant Scheme.

Jeffrey Gil

Jeffrey Gil is a Senior Lecturer in TESOL at Flinders University. He has also taught English as a Foreign Language (EFL) and Applied Linguistics courses at universities in China. His main research interests are English as a global language, English language education policy and planning in Asian contexts and the use and status of Chinese in the world. He has published widely on these topics. He is also the author of two books, Soft power and the worldwide promotion of Chinese language learning: The Confucius Institute project (Multilingual Matters, 2017) and The rise of Chinese as a global language: Prospects and obstacles (Palgrave, 2021), and co-editor of Exploring language in global contexts (Routledge, 2022).

Minglei Wang

Minglei Wang is a Ph.D. candidate and research assistant at Flinders University. His research topic is related to Chinese cultural diplomacy, with a specific focus on the China Cultural Centre. Minglei also holds an M.A. in Culture, Communication and Globalization from Aalborg University, Denmark.

[1] The Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office is a de facto embassy or consulate of the Republic of China (Taiwan), established in certain countries that have formal diplomatic relations with the PRC. The US does not formally recognise Taiwan as a sovereign country but conducts unofficial relations with it through the AIT, which effectively functions as its de facto embassy in Taiwan.

Official coronation portrait (Image credit: Royal Collection Trust/© Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, 2015)

The Queen and the English language are both unique within their categories. The Queen enjoyed special social status among humans through a complex combination of exceptional legal standing, imperial power, accumulated wealth, and sophisticated celebrity cult. The same is true of English: it is different from any other language in terms of reach, clout, and popularity.

English has more speakers than any other language

English today is said to have around 1.5 billion speakers, close to 20% of the global population. Even if counting speaker numbers is notoriously tricky, that’s a lot more than any other language in history. If we were to include everyone with basic proficiency, 1.5 billion is a substantial undercount.

But it is not the large number of speakers that makes English exceptional. After all, Chinese is not far behind with 1.1 billion speakers.

What makes English categorically different from Chinese is the relationship between first and second language speakers. The overwhelming majority of Chinese speakers live in Greater China and speak Chinese as their mother tongue.

By contrast, only a minority of ca. 370 million English speakers live in the United Kingdom and its settler colonies (most notably the USA but also Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and South Africa).

The vast majority of English speakers live outside the Anglosphere: some in former exploitation colonies of the UK or USA (e.g., India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Bangladesh, Ghana), and others in countries with no special ties to the Anglosphere where English is learned as a foreign language (e.g., China, Germany, France, Japan, Russia).

In short, what makes English exceptional among languages is twofold: it is widely used outside the heartlands of the Anglosphere, and it is learned as an additional language by countless multitudes across the globe.

The most spoken languages worldwide, 2022 (Source: Statista)

English is more powerful than any other language

A language does not have power per se. It derives its power from the people and institutions it is associated with. And English has been associated with some of the most powerful people and institutions of the 19^th, 20^th, and 21^st centuries.

The British Empire was the largest empire in human history, covering 35.5 million km² in 1920 (when it was at its largest), or more than a quarter of the world’s land mass. Even after the decline of the British Empire, English got a second imperial boost due to US global domination.

English is not only associated with powerful states but almost all international organizations have English as their working language (sometimes along with a few other languages), from Amnesty International to the World Trade Organization. Even organizations far removed from the Anglosphere have adopted an English Only policy, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The political might of English is accompanied by economic clout. Most of the world’s most powerful corporations are headquartered in the USA, and even those that are not have been adopting English as their corporate language.

The world’s richest people speak English, too: 8 of the world’s 10 richest people are based in the USA, and the other two (one in France, one in India) undoubtedly also have English in their repertoires.

The examples could go on and on to illustrate that English is spoken in most of the world’s halls of power. That creates an effect that sociologists call “misrecognition”. Power comes from control over military, economic, or political resources; not from language. However, because English is so consistently associated with high power, it becomes “misrecognized” as a source of power.

And because everyone wants a piece of the cake, everyone wants to learn English so that they, too, can reap the successes it seems to confer.

Countries with largest numbers of English speakers

English is more hegemonic than any other language

Misrecognition is closely tied to another exceptional characteristic of English: it dominates through the ideas associated with it. English is stereotypically associated with the best in almost any field of human endeavor.

Most languages are associated with cultural stereotypes, beliefs, ideas, and emotions. Unlike the specific and relatively narrow cultural stereotypes associated with other languages (e.g., “French sounds romantic”), ideas about English are highly versatile: it is the language of modernity itself.

English is seen as the language of Hollywood media glitz and glamour, the language of freedom and liberal democracy, or the language of science and technology. Indeed, the cultural versatility of English is so great that it not only serves as the language of global capitalism but can also appear as its antagonist: the language of resistance.

One important way in which the hegemony of English is maintained is through the pomp and pageantry of the British monarchy. We are currently seeing global media saturation coverage. Its effect is not only to create a cultural, emotional, aspirational, and personally-felt connection with the Queen but with everything she stands for, including the English language.

The future of English

Although the role of the Queen is highly exceptional, her passing reminds us that the role was filled by an ordinary human being. It is likely that the next incumbent will be less capable at arresting the decline of the British monarchy. The role is likely to become less special, with a reduced realm and against the continuing diversification of celebrity cults.

The passing of the Queen has unleashed a global media frenzy, which also reinforces the hegemony of English (Image credit: sohu.com)

It might take longer for English to see a diminished status. In the past, imperial languages such as Latin and Persian survived the empires that spread them by hundreds, if not thousands, of years.

At the same time, the fate of English now rests to a significant degree with the language policies of countries outside the Anglosphere. And these might change as beliefs about the importance of the language change. For instance, if China were to curtail the role of English language proficiency for university entrance, this could send speaker numbers plummeting quite quickly.

The role of English is no longer solely in the hands of the Anglosphere.

Related content

To explore further how English went from peripheral peasant tongue to global superspreader language, and what its meteoric rise means, head over to this guest lecture I delivered at Yunnan University, Kunming, China) on Sept 28, 2021.

How does one become an applied linguist?

This invites the question of how one becomes an applied linguist. As Grabe (2010) explains, it is unclear “what training (and what duration of training) might be most appropriate” to become an applied linguist (p. 44). Despite some interest in this question, such as Ellis’ (2016) edited collection of the life histories of several prominent applied linguists, this question has not been thoroughly explored.

Here I want to reflect on my academic background and how it has influenced my research and work.

Applied Linguistics with a Chinese focus

My first degree was a Bachelor of Arts in Languages and Applied Linguistics, with a major in Chinese language. Throughout this degree I also took Asian studies courses, including Chinese history and politics. This created an interest in how political, economic, cultural and social developments at the local, national and global levels are connected to language-based issues involving China. Inspired by this, I wrote my PhD dissertation on China’s language situation. It explored the changing use and status of English in China; the growing importance of the Chinese language in the world; and the potential impact of English on China’s ethnic minority languages. In more recent times, I have also become interested in how the Chinese government promotes Chinese language and culture abroad, especially through Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms.

China through the lens of languageIn this sense, my studies of Chinese history and politics gave important context to language-based issues and informed my understanding of them. But it is language-based issues that have always been the central focus of my research. For example, knowledge of China’s domestic political situation and its relations with the rest of the world are necessary for me to understand the changing use and status of English in China, while knowledge of China’s reemergence as a great power is necessary for understanding the promotion of Chinese language and culture abroad. In other words, I see China through the lens of language in my research. Hult (2010) refers to this approach as an angle, or a way of investigating the world through the theme of language.

Language in Asian Studies

My studies also gave me another perspective on language, that of language as a way of doing research. In Asian studies, language is often seen as a technique or tool for studying something else, such as history, politics or economics, and proficiency in one or more Asian languages is considered essential for researchers (see, for example, the discussion in Davis, 2015; Milner, 1999 and Platt, 2006). The necessity and utility of language for accessing academic and media sources was clearly emphasised to me, particularly at the postgraduate level. So too was the importance of fieldwork, which in my case has involved often involved travel to China to talk to teachers, students, and scholars among others. I have found this an invaluable way to understand how language-based issues are experienced by the people directly involved in them.

Applying applied linguistics

This has in turn led to a desire to resolve, or at least propose solutions to, such language-based issues. I have, for example, suggested how universities might better manage Confucius Institutes and proposed principles for how teachers can deal with the dilemmas of teaching English in a globalising world. This is what Bygate (2004, 2005) refers to as the pragmatic nature of applied linguistics – it is not just about describing language-based issues but also about developing, implementing and evaluating appropriate responses to them. I don’t claim to have had any great impact, but the goal of doing so has been important.

Engagement with language-based issues involving China has also been a feature of my working life. My first full-time teaching position was at Jilin University in Changchun, China, where I taught English language courses to undergraduates and applied linguistics courses to postgraduates. This experience shaped and informed my views on English language education in China and the role of English in Chinese society more broadly.

Shortly afterwards, I gained a position in ESOL/TESOL at Flinders University, where I design, teach, and administer TESOL courses. Like many academics, I endeavour to connect my research to my teaching. In the course English as a Global Language, I include discussions of the impact of English on Chinese language and culture, while in Language Assessment in TESOL I discuss the washback effect of English language tests like the College English Test (CET) and Test for English Majors (TEM). Where possible I also assign students readings from Chinese authors across my courses.

I hope this brief personal reflection will spark further discussion of how one comes to be an applied linguist and what it means to be an applied linguist working on language issues involving China.

References

Brumfit, C. (1997). How applied linguistics is the same as any other science. International Journal of Applied Linguistics, 7(1), 86-94.
Bygate, M. (2004). Some current trends in applied linguistics: Towards a generic view. AILA Review, 17(1), 6-22.
Bygate, M. (2005). Applied linguistics: A pragmatic discipline, a generic discipline? Applied Linguistics, 26(4), 568-581.
Davis, D. R. (2015). Three principles for an Asian humanities: Care first … learn from … connect histories. The Journal of Asian Studies, 74(1), 43-67.
Ellis, R. (Ed.). (2016). Becoming and being an applied linguist: The life histories of some applied linguists. John Benjamins Publishing Company.
Grabe, W. (2010) Applied linguistics: A twenty-first-century discipline. In R.B. Kaplan (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of applied linguistics (2nd ed.) (pp. 34-44). Oxford University Press.
Hult, F. M. (2010). Theme-based research in the transdisciplinary field of educational linguistics. In F. M. Hult (Ed.), Directions and prospects for educational linguistics (pp. 19-32). Springer.
Milner, A. (1999). Approaching Asia, and Asian studies, in Australia. Asian Studies Review, 23(2), 193-203.
Platt, M. (2006). The academic’s new clothes: the cult of theory versus the cultivation of language in Southeast Asian studies. In C. Chou & V. Houben (Eds.), Southeast Asian studies: Debates and new directions (pp. 86-101). International Institute for Asian Studies The Netherlands/Institute for Southeast Asian Studies Singapore.

Diversity of international students is celebrated through images that map students onto nations represented by their flags

International education is often touted as a golden road to fluency in another language and the development of a global vision. However, ethnographic research into the language learning and settlement experiences of international students in a variety of national contexts has painted a less rosy picture, as the Language-on-Move archives devoted to international education show.

Such research has found many discontinuities between the promises of international education and students’ actual experiences.

One of the problems in the existing system of international education is the nation-based categorization of seeing international students of diverse backgrounds as a homogeneous group (Piller, 2017).

This categorization is further complicated when international students return to their ancestral homelands for their international education. Such “return migrants” may be positioned in often conflicting ways on the continuum of local and migrant, native and foreigner, as our recent research explores (Li & Han, 2020).

Ethnic Chinese students migrating to China for their international education

As one of the largest diasporas, ethnic Chinese constitute a population of over 50 million. The great majority of them live in Southeast Asia. Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia have been perceived as a powerful nexus between China and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, mostly due to their remarkable economic performance and their historical contribution to China’s nationalist movement in the early twentieth century. As China is emerging as one of the largest receiving countries for international education, ethnic Chinese may get the first admission ticket to higher education institutions in China.

However, the prioritization of ethnic Chinese migrating to China for their international education is not without problems. These students are confronted with several linguistic and cultural challenges.

Some of these challenges are similar to what has been reported in previous studies, and others are specific to this group and have to date mostly been overlooked in the existing literature on international education.

One big challenge relates to a conflict between students’ self-perceptions of their identities and the ways in which others perceive them. An ethnic Chinese student from Myanmar, for instance, expressed her shock and confusion since coming to China: “我以为我的根在中国，来中国我发现我没根了！” (“I used to think that my roots are in China. However, coming to China has made me rootless.”)

Like this female student, ethnic Chinese students from Myanmar used to be oriented towards China. Learning Putonghua in Myanmar was a top priority for their transnational empowerment (Li, 2017; Li, 2020; Li, Ai, & Zhang, 2020). However, once they move to China for their studies, their trajectories gradually gear them to identify Myanmar as their true homeland and as their land of opportunity. How is this possible?

Linguistic and cultural essentialism

To find out, we (Li & Han 2020) examined the learning experiences of 14 ethnic Chinese from Myanmar who were enrolled in Putonghua-medium degree programs at a Chinese university. We found that the language ideologies of speaking standard Putonghua and writing simplified Chinese characters challenged these students’ sense of being authentically Chinese. In the process, they were turned from proficient Chinese speakers in Myanmar to deficient Putonghua speakers in China.

Ethnic Chinese students from Myanmar are often made to feel weird for engaging in practices that are considered “Burmese”, such as putting on thanaka, a protective white-paste face mask

National essentialism was another ideological force that challenged their Chinese identity. In their classrooms and everyday interactions, the students found themselves positioned not as ethnic Chinese but as Burmese nationals. This “one nation, one culture, one language” mindset not only erased our participants’ Chinese identity but also reinforced an essentialist view of Myanmar as the country of the Burmese, the dominant ethnic group in that highly diverse country.

Neo-essentialist curriculum

Most research into international education is based in Anglophone countries, where a monolingual mindset prevails and exclusive use of English is promoted while languages other than English are devalued.

This is not the case in China. China’s promotion of Putonghua as an international language follows a reciprocal approach that also values the languages international students bring. Their bilingualism is regarded as an asset. In our case, both Burmese and Putonghua constitute desired linguistic capital to achieve mutual cooperation and promote the regional economy and integration between China and ASEAN.

However, this promotion of bilingualism is not unproblematic, either. Linguistic diversity is not unconditionally valued but rests on its convertibility in an international communication market – between the Chinese and Burmese state in this context.

This orientation to the nation as a market applauds bilingualism in Burmese and Putonghua but marginalizes bilingualism in non-standard Chinese varieties and languages that are not official to a nation.

In short, our research demonstrates that the neoliberal valorization of bilingualism is not in and of itself better than the monolingual mindset: it only reproduces the cultural superiority of essentialized linguistic icons while devaluing and erasing non-privileged cultural forms and identities.

The future of Chinese international education

While the Covid-19 pandemic has revealed the language challenges confronting diverse populations worldwide (Piller, 2020; Piller, Zhang, & Li, 2020), it has also reconfigured the global economic and political order.

Since the outbreak of Covid-19 early last year, China has shifted its global strategy by strengthening its regional connectivity with Asian countries. In 2020, ASEAN replaced the USA and EU to become China’s largest trading partner. A recent trade agreement, Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) has reinforced the regional integration between China and its region. As the largest free trading zone covering 30% of the global populations and 30% of global GDP, RCEP will mark a new era for Asia-Pacific cooperation in various social dimensions.

Will the free movement of goods and people in this vast zone also lead us to a greater valorization of linguistic and cultural diversity? Will it open a space for embracing diversity and bringing greater equity and social justice?

Our research suggests that, as long as the ideological foundations of linguistic and cultural essentialism stay in place, the international education in RCEP may just be old wine in a new bottle.

References

Li, J. (2017). Social Reproduction and Migrant Education: A Critical Sociolinguistic Ethnography of Burmese Students’ Learning Experiences at a Border High School in China. (PhD). Macquarie University.
Li, J. (2020). Transnational migrant students between inclusive discourses and exclusionary practices. Multilingua, 39(2), 193-212. https://doi.org/10.1515/multi-2019-0125
Li, J., Ai, B., & Zhang, J. (2020). Negotiating language ideologies in learning Putonghua: Myanmar ethnic minority students’ perspectives on multilingual practices in a borderland school. Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development, 41(7), 633-646. doi:10.1080/01434632.2019.1678628
Li, J., & Han, H. (2020). Learning to orient toward Myanmar: ethnic Chinese students from Myanmar at a university in China. Language, Culture and Curriculum, 1-19. doi:10.1080/07908318.2020.1858095
Piller, I. (2017). Intercultural communication. Edinburgh University Press.
Piller, I. (Ed.) (2020). Language-on-the-Move COVID-19 Archives.
Piller, I., Zhang, J., & Li, J. (2020). Linguistic diversity in a time of crisis: Language challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic. Multilingua, 39(5), 503-515. https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/multi-2020-0136/html

(Image credit: Farooqi & Aftab, 2018)

Editor’s note: As Confucius Institutes are closing in western countries, as Jeffrey Gil analysed recently, Chinese language learning continues to expand across the global South. As an example, Kashif Raza reflects on the linguistic implications of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) here.

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The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a multimillion dollar project between Pakistan and China through which both countries aim to develop bilateral economic, cultural, social and military ties. However, none of the 68+ Pakistani languages are being used for information creation and dissemination in the operationalization of the project. In its current form, the project only enables participation by speakers of two languages, English and Mandarin Chinese, which have been adopted as official languages for the project. This is a missed opportunity for both countries to benefit their multilingual populations. With proper language policy development and implementation, this project could become an ideal multilingual economic model of South-South cooperation, where a multilingual workforce is engaged, recognized and benefits.

CPEC and Language Use

CPEC has many benefits for both Pakistan and China. However, the project has also posed a serious question for both countries: What languages are people going to use to communicate with each other? In correspondence with an official of the CPEC, I was told that there are three types of scenarios happening at the CPEC:

1. Chinese officials and stakeholders communicating with Chinese workers through Mandarin or other Chinese languages
2. Chinese officials, stakeholders and workers communicating with Pakistani worker through English, Urdu, or through interpreters
3. Pakistani officials, stakeholders and workers communicating with each other using English, Urdu, or any of the other local languages

Although Mandarin is used by the Chinese, and Urdu and other Pakistani languages by Pakistanis, English dominates the operationalization of the CPEC project for policy development and implementation with Mandarin taking the second place. Evidence of this comes from the use of English and, to a lesser degree, Mandarin in the production and dissemination of the information related to the CPEC. The Long Term Plan for China-Pakistan Economic Corridor 2017-2030 states:

This Agreement is copied in duplicate, each of which is written in Chinese and English, and both versions have the same meaning and will have the equal effect. 

Urdu learning in China

Both China and Pakistan are trying to promote each other’s languages at different levels. These language exchange initiatives, some of which started long before the inauguration of the CPEC, are led by governmental agencies (e.g., embassies) and private institutes.

Considering the importance of relations between Pakistan and China, different initiatives have been taken by the Chinese authorities to promote Urdu at multiple levels in China. One of these endeavors is the promotion of Urdu in education through major and minor courses that are mostly taught by Urdu-speaking Pakistani faculty and are offered by multiple universities in China. In an attempt to increase the number of Urdu speakers in China, several works have been translated from Urdu to Mandarin and Urdu language courses are being delivered at different institutions.

Peking University, in particular, has undertaken considerable work in this regard where efforts are being made to increase resources for Mandarin and Urdu language learners. After establishing the first Urdu Department in 1950 to offer basic Urdu language courses and translating multiple works from Urdu to Mandarin, the institute developed the first ever Mandarin-Urdu dictionary in the 1980s.  Similarly, Beijing Foreign Studies University (BFSU) has been teaching Urdu language courses since 2007. In order to provide an interactive Urdu language acquisition atmosphere, BFSU has been organizing various competitions in calligraphy and speech to familiarize Chinese students with Pakistani culture and history. Recently, Urdu Departments were established at Xi’an International Studies University and Guangdong University of Foreign Studies. We also see a lot of videos circulating on social media like Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp etc. where Chinese speakers of Urdu share their views in Urdu on contemporary topics like COVID-19, Pakistani culture and cuisine, tourism in Pakistan, and the Sino-Pak friendship in general.

Tea ceremony at Confucius Institute Islamabad (Image Credit: Xinhuanet)

The two main reasons for the popularity of Urdu in China since the CPEC inauguration are economic and cultural benefits. In terms of economy, many Urdu learners see either employment opportunities or chances of starting their own businesses. Since Chinese companies doing businesses with Pakistani counterparts need people that can help in communication between the two parties, learning Urdu can provide job opportunities for many as translators, Urdu language teachers, bilingual contract writers, and managers. Similarly, knowing Urdu can also help run businesses like import/export, manufacturing, and educational institutions (similar considerations with regard to Arabic in China are discussed here). On the other hand, attraction towards Pakistani culture, its tourist and religious destinations, food, and people are other reasons for the popularity of Urdu in China.

Chinese learning in Pakistan

As Chinese are learning Urdu, Mandarin Chinese is becoming popular among Pakistanis. We see governmental institutes as well as private entities involved in the promotion of Mandarin in Pakistan. A few examples of governmental support are the Chinese Embassy in Pakistan, Confucius Institutes, Pakistan Television, Sindh government memorandum of understanding with Chinese Education Department, Pakistan Senate Resolution in favor of teaching Mandarin in Pakistan and scholarships for Pakistani students and teachers who wish to develop Mandarin learning and teaching skills. Private institutes are also playing pivotal roles in promoting Mandarin.

As far as the benefits for Pakistanis learning Mandarin are concerned, the biggest incentive is the economic opportunities. Since CPEC is attracting a lot of Chinese businessmen and workers, Pakistani students of Mandarin find it as an opportunity to secure work as bilingual translators, interpreters, lawyers as well as supervisors. Similarly, there are educational, political and social factors that are encouraging Pakistanis to master Mandarin as a foreign language.

Economic Approach to Language Development for CPEC

As CPEC is a long-term economic project and has multiple advantages for both Pakistan and China, its success requires a deeper understanding and cooperation between Pakistan and China at social, cultural, educational, defense, economic as well as linguistic levels. A pragmatic approach that can guarantee the achievement of the objectives of this project is decision making through discussion and dialogue on all of the issues that both countries face. Language as a medium of communication is one of these issues that needs to be discussed and negotiated from both sides. This is not only important for increased communication between the two sides but also mandatory for strengthening other areas of cooperation.

Since Sino-Pak relations have a long history, both countries have been trying to promote each other’s languages through different means to strengthen multi-layered relationships between the two governments as well as its people. Nevertheless, language exchange has never been as critical as it is now. This calls for a proper language policy development that can resolve the medium of communication issue between the two neighbors and can pave the way for smooth people-to-people relationship development.

There are a lot of debates and discussions on the economic and military benefits of the CPEC project for both Pakistan and China. Although a few voices are also heard discussing the language issue related to CPEC, most of these articles portray the imposition of Chinese languages and the suppression of Urdu. None of the work done in this area looks at language issues through the lens of economic benefits for both countries in terms of increasing employment, enhancing people-to-people relations, developing cultural exchanges and promoting each other’s languages.

It is time to rethink multilingual language policies beyond established truths.

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(Image Credit: Confucius Institute Adelaide)

As vehicles for the promotion of Chinese language and culture, Confucius Institutes and Classrooms are a kind of global cultural flow. They can be considered a global project, which Nederveen Pieterse (2009) defines as the actions of people, groups, organisations and governments “to shape global conditions” in their favour (pp. 16-17). This is particularly the case considering they have recently been identified as an important aspect of achieving the Chinese Dream (中国梦zhōngguó mèng) of making China a global power. China hopes that the Chinese language teaching and cultural activities conducted by the Confucius Institutes and Classrooms will create a positive image and narrative of China, and thereby increase understanding of and sympathy for its positions and goals in global politics.

In my previous research, I adapted Held et al.’s (1999) framework for studying global flows to map and evaluate the Confucius Institute project. This framework consists of four components:

• Extensity: the geographical coverage of the Confucius Institute project
• Intensity: the volume of the Confucius Institute project
• Velocity: the speed of development of the Confucius Institute project
• Impact: the consequences or outcomes of the Confucius Institute project

I concluded the Confucius Institute project was a diffused global project because it covered much of the world (high extensity); the number of Confucius Institutes and Classrooms and the volume of their activities was substantial (high intensity); and it had reached these dimensions in not much more than a decade (high velocity). Its impact was low because, although it made a valuable contribution to Chinese language and culture education, it did not influence the policies and actions of other countries in ways favourable to China, or create more positive views of China (Gil, 2017).

(Source: Hanban)

At present though, global cultural flows are being reshaped by the COVID-19 pandemic. Most obviously, Confucius Institutes and Classrooms, like other educational institutions, have suspended or altered their normal activities. The University of Adelaide Confucius Institute, for example, has moved many of its activities online, including a Chinese conversation corner, HSK exam preparation classes and cultural activity classes.

But another change is also underway – Confucius Institutes and Classrooms are closing in increasing numbers and with increasing frequency. Sweden recently became the first European country to close all of its Confucius Institutes and Classrooms. In January, the University of Maryland – the first American university to host a Confucius Institute – announced its Confucius Institute would close at the end of the 2019 to 2020 academic year. The University of Delaware, University of Kansas, University of Arizona and University of Missouri also indicated late last year or early this year that their Institutes would be closing. In the USA alone, some 29 have shut since 2014, most in the last two years. Globally, around 50 closed between 2013 and 2020. This is a remarkable reversal of the previous growth in the Confucius Institute project. In the years 2008 to 2015, for example, there was an average annual increase of 37 Confucius Institutes and 122 Confucius Classrooms (Gil, 2017).

How are these closures connected to the COVID-19 pandemic, and what might the Confucius Institute project look like in a post-pandemic world?

Like any global project, the Confucius Institute project has received mixed reactions. Some regard it as beneficial for Chinese language and culture education because Confucius Institutes and Classrooms provide valuable resources, such as teaching materials, teaching staff, language classes and cultural activities. Others regard it as a threat. Confucius Institutes and Classrooms, according to proponents of this view, restrict academic freedom, spread propaganda, engender self-censorship and allow China to influence universities and schools.

This second view of the Confucius Institute project is the driving force behind the closures. It is founded on opposition to the nature of China’s political system, as well as its policies and conduct, domestically and internationally. Most recently, China’s treatment of the Uyghur minority in Xinjiang, actions in the South China Sea and handling of the Hong Kong protests have all negatively impacted its reputation and the way it is perceived. There is growing reluctance on the part of foreign universities and schools to be involved with a project with connections to the Chinese government.

The COVID-19 pandemic is also affecting China’s reputation and image in the world. Because China is where the virus most likely originated, and the government mishandled the initial stages of the outbreak, negative views of China have increased. China’s attempts to spread disinformation about the virus, as well as its sometimes aggressive responses to concerns raised by other countries, have also created suspicion and mistrust. A recent poll by the Pew Research Centre, for example, found that 71% of Americans had no confidence in President Xi Jinping, 66% had an unfavourable view of China and 62% saw China’s power and influence as a major threat.

It is likely that these general perceptions of China will influence views on the Confucius Institutes and Classrooms, and contribute to more closures. As a result, the Confucius Institute project is likely to lose ground as a global project.

Confucius Institute Logo (Source: Confuciusmag)

However, the number of Confucius Institutes and Classrooms which have closed represents a small percentage of the total number. According to Hanban, the body responsible for Confucius Institutes and Classrooms, there are 541 Institutes and 1,170 Classrooms in the world, although it is unclear whether this figure reflects the most recent closures. So, a complete end to the Confucius Institute project is unlikely – it will continue in some form after the pandemic.

An important clue to what it might look like is the geography of the closures. So far, they have mainly occurred in North America, Europe and Australia – Confucius Institutes and Classrooms in other regions of the world are not closing. This is not surprising considering Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East have in recent times had positive views of China and its influence.

Another indication of the future shape of the Confucius Institute project is China’s own priorities. In 2019, China announced a plan to “optimise” the spread of Confucius Institutes, which suggested the emphasis will be on countries included in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The Confucius Institute project may progressively become focused on, and possibly even confined to, these countries.

This would mean it moves towards being what Held et al. (1999) call a thin global project – it would maintain its high extensity, but its intensity, velocity and impact would be low, or at least lower than before.

The COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted the nature of global cultural flows, but China nevertheless remains an important “pole in the global geopolitical, economic and cultural order” (Grey & Piller, 2020, p. 55). It will therefore be influential in generating global flows once the pandemic has passed, and the Confucius Institute project will be part of this, although on a somewhat different scale and scope.

References

Gil, J. (2017). Soft power and the worldwide promotion of Chinese language learning: The Confucius Institute project. Bristol: Multilingual Matters.
Grey, A. & Piller, I. (2020). Sociolinguistic ethnographies of globalisation. In K. Tusting (Ed.), The Routledge handbook of linguistic ethnography (pp. 54-69). London: Routledge.
Held, D., McGrew, A., Goldblatt, D. & Perraton, J. (1999). Global transformations: Politics, economics and culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nederveen Pieterse, J. (2009). Globalization and culture: Global mélange (2nd ed.).  Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

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