(Image credit: Farooqi & Aftab, 2018)

Editor’s note: As Confucius Institutes are closing in western countries, as Jeffrey Gil analysed recently, Chinese language learning continues to expand across the global South. As an example, Kashif Raza reflects on the linguistic implications of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) here.

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The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a multimillion dollar project between Pakistan and China through which both countries aim to develop bilateral economic, cultural, social and military ties. However, none of the 68+ Pakistani languages are being used for information creation and dissemination in the operationalization of the project. In its current form, the project only enables participation by speakers of two languages, English and Mandarin Chinese, which have been adopted as official languages for the project. This is a missed opportunity for both countries to benefit their multilingual populations. With proper language policy development and implementation, this project could become an ideal multilingual economic model of South-South cooperation, where a multilingual workforce is engaged, recognized and benefits.

CPEC and Language Use

CPEC has many benefits for both Pakistan and China. However, the project has also posed a serious question for both countries: What languages are people going to use to communicate with each other? In correspondence with an official of the CPEC, I was told that there are three types of scenarios happening at the CPEC:

1. Chinese officials and stakeholders communicating with Chinese workers through Mandarin or other Chinese languages
2. Chinese officials, stakeholders and workers communicating with Pakistani worker through English, Urdu, or through interpreters
3. Pakistani officials, stakeholders and workers communicating with each other using English, Urdu, or any of the other local languages

Although Mandarin is used by the Chinese, and Urdu and other Pakistani languages by Pakistanis, English dominates the operationalization of the CPEC project for policy development and implementation with Mandarin taking the second place. Evidence of this comes from the use of English and, to a lesser degree, Mandarin in the production and dissemination of the information related to the CPEC. The Long Term Plan for China-Pakistan Economic Corridor 2017-2030 states:

This Agreement is copied in duplicate, each of which is written in Chinese and English, and both versions have the same meaning and will have the equal effect. 

Urdu learning in China

Both China and Pakistan are trying to promote each other’s languages at different levels. These language exchange initiatives, some of which started long before the inauguration of the CPEC, are led by governmental agencies (e.g., embassies) and private institutes.

Considering the importance of relations between Pakistan and China, different initiatives have been taken by the Chinese authorities to promote Urdu at multiple levels in China. One of these endeavors is the promotion of Urdu in education through major and minor courses that are mostly taught by Urdu-speaking Pakistani faculty and are offered by multiple universities in China. In an attempt to increase the number of Urdu speakers in China, several works have been translated from Urdu to Mandarin and Urdu language courses are being delivered at different institutions.

Peking University, in particular, has undertaken considerable work in this regard where efforts are being made to increase resources for Mandarin and Urdu language learners. After establishing the first Urdu Department in 1950 to offer basic Urdu language courses and translating multiple works from Urdu to Mandarin, the institute developed the first ever Mandarin-Urdu dictionary in the 1980s.  Similarly, Beijing Foreign Studies University (BFSU) has been teaching Urdu language courses since 2007. In order to provide an interactive Urdu language acquisition atmosphere, BFSU has been organizing various competitions in calligraphy and speech to familiarize Chinese students with Pakistani culture and history. Recently, Urdu Departments were established at Xi’an International Studies University and Guangdong University of Foreign Studies. We also see a lot of videos circulating on social media like Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp etc. where Chinese speakers of Urdu share their views in Urdu on contemporary topics like COVID-19, Pakistani culture and cuisine, tourism in Pakistan, and the Sino-Pak friendship in general.

Tea ceremony at Confucius Institute Islamabad (Image Credit: Xinhuanet)

The two main reasons for the popularity of Urdu in China since the CPEC inauguration are economic and cultural benefits. In terms of economy, many Urdu learners see either employment opportunities or chances of starting their own businesses. Since Chinese companies doing businesses with Pakistani counterparts need people that can help in communication between the two parties, learning Urdu can provide job opportunities for many as translators, Urdu language teachers, bilingual contract writers, and managers. Similarly, knowing Urdu can also help run businesses like import/export, manufacturing, and educational institutions (similar considerations with regard to Arabic in China are discussed here). On the other hand, attraction towards Pakistani culture, its tourist and religious destinations, food, and people are other reasons for the popularity of Urdu in China.

Chinese learning in Pakistan

As Chinese are learning Urdu, Mandarin Chinese is becoming popular among Pakistanis. We see governmental institutes as well as private entities involved in the promotion of Mandarin in Pakistan. A few examples of governmental support are the Chinese Embassy in Pakistan, Confucius Institutes, Pakistan Television, Sindh government memorandum of understanding with Chinese Education Department, Pakistan Senate Resolution in favor of teaching Mandarin in Pakistan and scholarships for Pakistani students and teachers who wish to develop Mandarin learning and teaching skills. Private institutes are also playing pivotal roles in promoting Mandarin.

As far as the benefits for Pakistanis learning Mandarin are concerned, the biggest incentive is the economic opportunities. Since CPEC is attracting a lot of Chinese businessmen and workers, Pakistani students of Mandarin find it as an opportunity to secure work as bilingual translators, interpreters, lawyers as well as supervisors. Similarly, there are educational, political and social factors that are encouraging Pakistanis to master Mandarin as a foreign language.

Economic Approach to Language Development for CPEC

As CPEC is a long-term economic project and has multiple advantages for both Pakistan and China, its success requires a deeper understanding and cooperation between Pakistan and China at social, cultural, educational, defense, economic as well as linguistic levels. A pragmatic approach that can guarantee the achievement of the objectives of this project is decision making through discussion and dialogue on all of the issues that both countries face. Language as a medium of communication is one of these issues that needs to be discussed and negotiated from both sides. This is not only important for increased communication between the two sides but also mandatory for strengthening other areas of cooperation.

Since Sino-Pak relations have a long history, both countries have been trying to promote each other’s languages through different means to strengthen multi-layered relationships between the two governments as well as its people. Nevertheless, language exchange has never been as critical as it is now. This calls for a proper language policy development that can resolve the medium of communication issue between the two neighbors and can pave the way for smooth people-to-people relationship development.

There are a lot of debates and discussions on the economic and military benefits of the CPEC project for both Pakistan and China. Although a few voices are also heard discussing the language issue related to CPEC, most of these articles portray the imposition of Chinese languages and the suppression of Urdu. None of the work done in this area looks at language issues through the lens of economic benefits for both countries in terms of increasing employment, enhancing people-to-people relations, developing cultural exchanges and promoting each other’s languages.

It is time to rethink multilingual language policies beyond established truths.

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(Image Credit: Confucius Institute Adelaide)

As vehicles for the promotion of Chinese language and culture, Confucius Institutes and Classrooms are a kind of global cultural flow. They can be considered a global project, which Nederveen Pieterse (2009) defines as the actions of people, groups, organisations and governments “to shape global conditions” in their favour (pp. 16-17). This is particularly the case considering they have recently been identified as an important aspect of achieving the Chinese Dream (中国梦zhōngguó mèng) of making China a global power. China hopes that the Chinese language teaching and cultural activities conducted by the Confucius Institutes and Classrooms will create a positive image and narrative of China, and thereby increase understanding of and sympathy for its positions and goals in global politics.

In my previous research, I adapted Held et al.’s (1999) framework for studying global flows to map and evaluate the Confucius Institute project. This framework consists of four components:

• Extensity: the geographical coverage of the Confucius Institute project
• Intensity: the volume of the Confucius Institute project
• Velocity: the speed of development of the Confucius Institute project
• Impact: the consequences or outcomes of the Confucius Institute project

I concluded the Confucius Institute project was a diffused global project because it covered much of the world (high extensity); the number of Confucius Institutes and Classrooms and the volume of their activities was substantial (high intensity); and it had reached these dimensions in not much more than a decade (high velocity). Its impact was low because, although it made a valuable contribution to Chinese language and culture education, it did not influence the policies and actions of other countries in ways favourable to China, or create more positive views of China (Gil, 2017).

(Source: Hanban)

At present though, global cultural flows are being reshaped by the COVID-19 pandemic. Most obviously, Confucius Institutes and Classrooms, like other educational institutions, have suspended or altered their normal activities. The University of Adelaide Confucius Institute, for example, has moved many of its activities online, including a Chinese conversation corner, HSK exam preparation classes and cultural activity classes.

But another change is also underway – Confucius Institutes and Classrooms are closing in increasing numbers and with increasing frequency. Sweden recently became the first European country to close all of its Confucius Institutes and Classrooms. In January, the University of Maryland – the first American university to host a Confucius Institute – announced its Confucius Institute would close at the end of the 2019 to 2020 academic year. The University of Delaware, University of Kansas, University of Arizona and University of Missouri also indicated late last year or early this year that their Institutes would be closing. In the USA alone, some 29 have shut since 2014, most in the last two years. Globally, around 50 closed between 2013 and 2020. This is a remarkable reversal of the previous growth in the Confucius Institute project. In the years 2008 to 2015, for example, there was an average annual increase of 37 Confucius Institutes and 122 Confucius Classrooms (Gil, 2017).

How are these closures connected to the COVID-19 pandemic, and what might the Confucius Institute project look like in a post-pandemic world?

Like any global project, the Confucius Institute project has received mixed reactions. Some regard it as beneficial for Chinese language and culture education because Confucius Institutes and Classrooms provide valuable resources, such as teaching materials, teaching staff, language classes and cultural activities. Others regard it as a threat. Confucius Institutes and Classrooms, according to proponents of this view, restrict academic freedom, spread propaganda, engender self-censorship and allow China to influence universities and schools.

This second view of the Confucius Institute project is the driving force behind the closures. It is founded on opposition to the nature of China’s political system, as well as its policies and conduct, domestically and internationally. Most recently, China’s treatment of the Uyghur minority in Xinjiang, actions in the South China Sea and handling of the Hong Kong protests have all negatively impacted its reputation and the way it is perceived. There is growing reluctance on the part of foreign universities and schools to be involved with a project with connections to the Chinese government.

The COVID-19 pandemic is also affecting China’s reputation and image in the world. Because China is where the virus most likely originated, and the government mishandled the initial stages of the outbreak, negative views of China have increased. China’s attempts to spread disinformation about the virus, as well as its sometimes aggressive responses to concerns raised by other countries, have also created suspicion and mistrust. A recent poll by the Pew Research Centre, for example, found that 71% of Americans had no confidence in President Xi Jinping, 66% had an unfavourable view of China and 62% saw China’s power and influence as a major threat.

It is likely that these general perceptions of China will influence views on the Confucius Institutes and Classrooms, and contribute to more closures. As a result, the Confucius Institute project is likely to lose ground as a global project.

Confucius Institute Logo (Source: Confuciusmag)

However, the number of Confucius Institutes and Classrooms which have closed represents a small percentage of the total number. According to Hanban, the body responsible for Confucius Institutes and Classrooms, there are 541 Institutes and 1,170 Classrooms in the world, although it is unclear whether this figure reflects the most recent closures. So, a complete end to the Confucius Institute project is unlikely – it will continue in some form after the pandemic.

An important clue to what it might look like is the geography of the closures. So far, they have mainly occurred in North America, Europe and Australia – Confucius Institutes and Classrooms in other regions of the world are not closing. This is not surprising considering Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East have in recent times had positive views of China and its influence.

Another indication of the future shape of the Confucius Institute project is China’s own priorities. In 2019, China announced a plan to “optimise” the spread of Confucius Institutes, which suggested the emphasis will be on countries included in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The Confucius Institute project may progressively become focused on, and possibly even confined to, these countries.

This would mean it moves towards being what Held et al. (1999) call a thin global project – it would maintain its high extensity, but its intensity, velocity and impact would be low, or at least lower than before.

The COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted the nature of global cultural flows, but China nevertheless remains an important “pole in the global geopolitical, economic and cultural order” (Grey & Piller, 2020, p. 55). It will therefore be influential in generating global flows once the pandemic has passed, and the Confucius Institute project will be part of this, although on a somewhat different scale and scope.

References

Gil, J. (2017). Soft power and the worldwide promotion of Chinese language learning: The Confucius Institute project. Bristol: Multilingual Matters.
Grey, A. & Piller, I. (2020). Sociolinguistic ethnographies of globalisation. In K. Tusting (Ed.), The Routledge handbook of linguistic ethnography (pp. 54-69). London: Routledge.
Held, D., McGrew, A., Goldblatt, D. & Perraton, J. (1999). Global transformations: Politics, economics and culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nederveen Pieterse, J. (2009). Globalization and culture: Global mélange (2nd ed.).  Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

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